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More confidence. More buy-in. More boldness.

You might think it’s false bravado — that a reality check is coming at some point. You might be right. We’ll see.

But through one game, at least, there’s data to support the idea that change is afoot for ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ football.

In this week’s “Cats Stats,â€� we’ll make the case that the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ were more aggressive — on both sides of the ball — in their opener vs. Hawaii than at any juncture last season.

Going for it

Let’s start with offense. When you look at the play-calling distribution — 31 running plays vs. 25 passing plays after adjusting for sacks — you’d think the game plan was anything but aggressive. But that’s the wrong place to look.

Head coach Brent Brennan made the decision to go for it on fourth down two times from ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥â€™s side of the 50-yard line. The ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ had the lead in each situation.

Do you know how many times Brennan made that call under those circumstances last year? Try none.

ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ went for it on fourth down 18 times in 2024. Only Kansas (15) had fewer fourth-down attempts .

On 16 of those occasions, the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ were trailing. They were down two or more scores 14 times. All but one of those attempts occurred in the second halves of games (the lone exception: a fourth-and-2 try vs. ASU in the second quarter, when ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ trailed 28-0).

In other words, Brennan went for it because he basically had no other choice. Desperation had set in.

What about those times when ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ wasn’t trailing and wasn’t down two or more scores? Glad you asked.

In last year’s opener, the UA went for it on fourth-and-1 from the New Mexico 23-yard line while leading 48-31 in the fourth quarter. That’s about as safe of a fourth-down call as one can make. (Quali Conley scored a touchdown on that play, by the way.)

Two weeks later, at Kansas State, ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ went for it on fourth-and-1 at the KSU 31. The game was scoreless at the time in the first quarter. Again, minimal risk.

Against Texas Tech on Oct. 5, the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ went for it on fourth-and-1 from the Red Raiders’ 20 in the second quarter. Tech led 7-3 at the time.

Finally, at BYU the following week, ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ went for it on fourth-and-1 from the Cougars’ 24 in the second quarter. BYU was up 14-7.

What do each of these four examples have in common? In every situation, ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ needed the fewest possible yards to get a first down. And each time, the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ were inside the opponent’s 35-yard line. If they didn’t convert, they weren’t putting their defense in a tough spot with a short field.

Both fourth-down attempts vs. Hawaii were of the short variety — fourth-and-1 and fourth-and-2. But ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ was positioned at its own 44 and 34. And the game was still in the balance each time, with the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ holding leads of 14-3 in the second quarter and 24-6 in the third.

Those were relatively high-risk decisions by Brennan, who seemed risk-averse a year ago.

“I felt good about how we were running the football,� said Brennan, whose team hosts Weber State on Saturday. “It’s always a case-by-case situation. Sometimes you’re in that spot and the players are (saying), ‘Go for it, go for it’. And you’re like, ‘In the event we don’t get it, we just gave them a 40-yard field, which results in points a high percentage of the time for the opponent.’ So there’s always that catch-22.�

Fans and media are notorious for second-guessing coaches’ fourth-down decisions. It helps when you convert. Tailback Quincy Craig gained 7 yards on that first fourth-down attempt vs. Hawaii; quarterback Noah Fifita got 4 yards on the second one.

But as Brennan himself said during the offseason, the program needs to value process over results. If some fourth-down outcomes don’t go ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥â€™s way — and the analytical data that his staff provides him supports those decisions — so be it.

Bevy of blitzes

On defense, coordinator Danny Gonzales has been instilling an aggressive mindset since spring.

You could see it in the way ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥â€™s defenders — especially the defensive backs — were hitting Hawaii’s ball-carriers and receivers.

You can also see it in the numbers — specifically the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥â€™ blitz rate.

ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ sent five or more rushers after Hawaii quarterbacks Micah Alejado and Luke Weaver on 61.1% of their dropbacks, according to Pro Football Focus. That was a higher rate than in any game last season — and more than double the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥â€™ season-long blitz percentage.

Under former coordinator Duane Akina, ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ blitzed opposing quarterbacks 30% of the time in 2024. Only once did the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ exceed 50%, blitzing TCU on 57.6% of the Horned Frogs’ dropbacks. That didn’t go well.

On only two other occasions did the ‘24 Cats top 38% — versus New Mexico and Utah. ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ won both of those games. Its blitz rate was 37.9% vs. ASU, and that was a blowout loss. So we can’t really draw a direct correlation between blitz percentage and winning percentage.

But that’s not the point here. The point is that Gonzales isn’t going to sit back and let opposing offenses assert themselves. His defense is going to attack them.

That mentality was evident after Alejado exited the game because of injury. ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ blitzed him 54.3% of the time. When the more mobile Weaver entered the game, Gonzales turned up the pressure, blitzing at a 73.7% rate.

Keep in mind, too, that the ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ were leading 31-6 at the time. Just over five minutes remained in the third quarter. Gonzales could have throttled down at that point. He went the other way, and ÃÛÁÄÖ±²¥ pitched a second-half shutout. All three interceptions that Alejado and Weaver threw came against the blitz, per PFF.

Fortune favors the bold, right?